For a general overview of sketicism, watch the YouTube video "What is Skepticism? A primer for understanding reality."
In many circumstances the assertion in question will be a client’s assertion that the financial statements are free of material misstatement, but the definition could apply to other assertions as well (e.g., attesting to the effectiveness of a client’s internal controls). This definition reflects more of a "presumptive doubt" than a "neutral" view of professional skepticism, implying that auditors who exhibit high professional skepticism are auditors who need relatively more persuasive evidence (in terms of quality and/or quantity) to be convinced that an assertion is correct. Depending on how an auditor's decisions are evaluated, it is possible under this definition for an auditor to exhibit too much professional skepticism, in that they could design overly inefficient and expensive audits.
The paper provides a model that describes how audit evidence combines with auditor knowledge, traits, and incentives to produce judgments that reflect professional skepticism. The model also describes how, given a judgment that reflects some level of professional skepticism, the judgment combines with auditor knowledge, traits and incentives to produce actions that reflect relatively more or less professional skepticism. The model highlights that auditors’ pre-existing knowledge, traits and incentives all combine (and potentially trade off or interact) to affect the amount of professional skepticism in audit judgment and audit actions. This perspective also facilitates understanding how audit firms can influence professional skepticism in practice via hiring, training, performance appraisal, review, decision aids, incentives and changes in tasks and institutions.